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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(h), and pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
CONTRACTS
1. Whether the trial court erred in it's interpretation of various "California Residential Purchase
Agreements" and if s conclusion of law as stated within the court's "Findings of Fact" #13.
Determinative Law: "Contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which
is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the
intentions of the makers and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and understandably made,
are just and equitable in their provisions, and are not obtained by fraud or overreaching ."
Matlock v.Matlock. 223 Kan 679,576 P.2d 629,633 (1978)
Standard of Review; Interpretation of a contract presents a question of law for which the trial
court's determination is reviewed under a correction of error standard, according no particular
deference to the trial court's decision.
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
4. Whether the trial court erred in the distribution of Respondent/Appeallee's "Woodward"
share of Petitioner/Appealant's retirement benefits.
Determinative Law: "It is preferable to end the marriage and allow the parties to make as
much of a clean break from each other as is reasonably possible." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d
1076 at 1079 (Utah App.1988) "Pursuant to Woodward, the preferred method for doing so is to fix the
other spouse's share of the pension plan, as adjusted for all the appropriate considerations, and
satisfy the other spouse's share out of other assets, thereby leaving all pension benefits to the
employee." See Woodward 656 P.2d 431 at 433 (Utah App. 1982). "This is especially true when
there are sufficient other assets for equitable distribution and a present value of the retirement benefits
can be established." See Cambers v. Chambers, 840 p.2d 841 at 845 (Utah App. 1992) citing
Motes v Motes. 786 P.2d 232 at 234 (Utah App 1989).
Standard of Review: The trial court's determination is reviewed under a correction of error
standard, according no particular deference to the trial court.
-2-

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from the final judgement and "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce" of the
Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, Honorable Thomas L. Kay, presiding,
filed March 21,2007 following a hearing on July 3,2006 during which the court considered the
following matters:
CONTRACTS
1.) whether Mrs, Bayles, Respondent/Appellee, should be held in contempt for breach of contract,
and compelled to give specific performance in connection with two (2) "California Vacant Land
Purchase Agreements" and a "California Residential Purchase Agreement" entered into by Mrs.
Bayles, under which Mr. Bayles, Petitioner/Appellent, exercised a right of first refusal granted him
by the court in the interlocatory "Decree of Devorce". Such issues were certified for trial by an
"Order on Order to Show Cause" filed April 7,2005 (Record on Appeal page 400)
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
2.) a "Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" filed June 2,2004 (Record on Appeal page 244)
as provided by the interlocutory "Decree of Divorce" (Record on Appeal page 167) the amount of a
Survivor Benefit awarded to Respondent/Appellee, and which party should pay the monthly cost,
which issues the Court reserved for future determination, subject to a provision that
Petitioner/Appellent should not elect a reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination as to
the amount and who should pay the monthly cost, (see "Decree of Divorce", paragraphs #24, #26
and #27.)

Petitioner/Appellant objects to the provisions of the Courts "Order Modifying the Decree of
Divorce" concerning (among other matters): 1) the trial court's interpretation of the various
California Purchase Agreements; and 2) The manner of distributing RespondentAppeallee's
share of Petitioner/Apellant's retirement benefits;
-3-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. Bayles, the Petitioner/Appellant was granted an interlocutory "Decree of Divorce" from
Mrs. Bayles, Respondent/Appellee by the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah
filed November 25,2002, effective October 2,2002. (See Decree of Divorce, page 1., paragraph 2.)
CONTRACTS
2. At the time of the divorce the parties held eight (8) parcels of real property in the State of
California as follows; (Decree of Divorce, page 3M paragraph 12.)
1.) three (3) parcels together with a double-wide mobile
home;
2.) a personal residence;
3.) two (2) parcels together known as the "Beehive Mine"
property;
4.) a 23-acre parcel known as the "lake" property; and
5.) a 5-acre parcel.
3. The "Decree of Divorce" ordered that all the California real properties be sold and the net
proceeds be split 50/50 between Appellant and Appellee. The decree further awarded a Right of First
Refusal to Petitioner/Appellant to aquire Responent/Appellee's interest in the property upon her
acceptance of a bona-fide offer. The "Right" was to be based on the same terms as the bona-fide
offer and was to be executed within 30 days of being notified by RespondentAppellee of her
acceptance of an offer. Petitioner/Appellant was ordered to pay Respondent/Appellee the amount
she would receive from the sale of the parcel based on the same terms of the bona-fide offer and
was to make payment within 30 days of Petitioner/Appellant's exercise of his right of first refusal.
(Decree of Divorce, page 4., paragraph 15 & 17)
4. On May 13,2003 shortly after the divorce the three (3) parcels with the mobile home were
sold to a third party through escrow. Respondent/Appellee received $44,419.80 at the escrow
closing of that sale. (Transcript of Trial, page 73, lines 10-13)
-4-

5. During May of 2003 Appellant exercised his Right of First Refusal under a Uniform Real
Estate Sales Contract to purchase Appellee's interest in the California personal residence. On or
about June 4,2003 Appellant paid the sum of $39,286.74 for that interest. Appellee accepted the
payment, gave a quit-claim deed, and demanded an additional amount of $4,350 which the trial court
awarded her. (Transcript of Trial, page 75, lines 1 - 6) Appellee refused to comply with any of the
terms of the Uniform Real Estate Sales Contract. In it's Order Modifying Decree of Divorce entered
March 21,2007 the trial court found that Appellee was in breach of the contract but denied an order
for specific performance finding she is not required to comply with any of the terms of the sales
agreement, which is one of the issues of this appeal.
6. During November, 2004 Appellant exercised his Right of First Refusal under a Uniform
Real Estate Sales Contract to purchase Appellee's interest in California real property (consisting of
two (2) parcels) known as the "Beehive Mine" property. On or about Dec 6,2004 Appellant paid the
sum of $25,596.22 for that interest. Payment was sent along with a letter in which Petitioner/Appellant
demanded Respondent/Appellee comply with the terms of the bona-fide contract. (Transcript of Trial,
page 75, lines 13-25)

She accepted the payment, but refused to open escrow or comply with any

of the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Sales Contract, In it's Order Modifying Decree of Divorce the
trial court found Appellee was in breach of the contract but denied an order for specific performance
finding she is not required to comply with any of the terms of the sales agreement, which is one of the
issues of this appeal.
7. During February, 2005 Appellant exercised his Right of First Refusal under a Uniform
Real Estate Sales Contract to purchase Appellee's interest in the California real property known as the
"Lake" property. On or about Mar 5,2005 Appellant paid the sum of $38,866.71 for that interest.
Payment was sent along with a letter in which Petitioner/Appellant demanded Respondent/Appellee
comply with the terms of the bona-fide contract. (Transcript of Trial, page 76, lines 7-16)

She

accepted the payment, but refused to open escrow, deliver a deed, or comply with any of the terms
of the Uniform Real Estate Sales Contract. In it's Order Modifying Decree of Divorce the trial court
-5-

found Appellee was in breach of the contract but denied an order for specific performance finding she
is not required to comply with any of the terms of the sales agreement, which is one of the issues of
this appeal.
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
8. The interlocutory "Decree of Divorce" awarded Respondent/Appellee a "Woodward" share
of Petitioner/Appellant's retirement benefits and a 100% survivor benefit pending Petitioner/Appellant's
retirement. The decree specifically provided that his retirement would be sufficient grounds for a
petition for modification to determine the proper amount of survivor benefit and who should be required
to pay the cost of that benefit. (Decree of Divorce, page 6., paragraph 24.)
9. The interlocutory decree reserved for future determination the issue of the proper amount
of survivor benefits to be awarded and the issue of which party should pay the monthly cost to be
determined at the time of Petitioner/Appellant's retirement. However, in order to avoid forfeiture of the
ability to elect a full survivor benefit, the court ordered Appellant to not elect a reduced survivor benefit.
(Decree of Divorce, page 7., paragraph 26 & 27.)
10. Petitioner/Appellant retired on disability effective November 31,2002. (Transcript of Trial,
page 26, lines 17-21) Upon retirement he elected a 100% survivor benefit pursuant to the trial court's
order within the Decree of Divorce, pending determination of the court as to the appropriate amount of
the survivor benefit and who should pay the cost of that benefit.
11. A hearing was held regarding the "Petition to Modify" on July 3,2006. The trial court
rendered it's decision on the Petition on July 5,2006. The "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"
and the "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce" were final upon their filing on March 21,2007.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. CONTRACTS: The trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of each of the
California Purchase Agreements. The trial court committed legal error by incorrectly selecting only
one element or provision of each of three (3) California Purchase Agreements (ie: the consideration
to be paid) in it's application of established or normal rules of contract construction or interpretation.
By selecting only one element of each of the contracts, the court effectively created unenforceable
unilateral contracts. Thus, Plaintiff/Appellant's payment for each of the properties should be returned
and the properties placed back on the market to obtain truely bona-fide enforceable purchase offers.
However, the transactions between the parties as to each parcel of property, meet the longstanding
"offer, acceptance and tender" requirements of any contract transaction. Mrs. Bayles received the
benefit of tender, to the detriment of Mr. Bayles and the court's equitable powers do not allow the trial
court to modify a transaction simply because one of the parties has come to regret the agreement.
Mr. Bayles is entitled to specific performance as to each contract for his purchase of Mrs. Bayles's
interest in each of the contracts.
2. DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS: The trial court committed legal error by not
applying the plain language of various Utah Appeallate Court Cases which establishfixedprinciples
for distribution of vested retirement benefits. Especially where the present value of an annuity can
easily be determined and where there are sufficient assets to provide a lump sum "cash-out" of the
Respondent/Appellee's marital interest in the annuity. While the court properly applied the
"Woodward" formula for determining the proper portion of the spousal interest, it clearly failed to
apply the proper manner of distribution of that interest as established in the "Woodward" case as well
as other cases.
-7-

ARGUMENT
CONTRACTS
1. Mr. Bayles, the Petitioner/Appellant, is entitled to specific performance relative to the
purchase of Mrs. Bayles's one-half interest in each of the California properties.
2. The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the validity If the rule that "to be
enforceable a contract must be sufficiently definite in it's terms that the parties know what is
required of them" Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah App. 1967); and Kier v. Condrack,
478 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1970).
3. Under the evidence and the particular facts of this case there is no dispute that Mr Bayles
agreed to purchase Mrs. Bayles's interest in each of the subject properties. Mrs. Bayles agreed to
open an escrow and provide other products and services in consideration of payment by Mr. Bayles
of the agreed upon tender.
4. Mrs. Bayles negotiated the terms of each of the three contracts in this case with third
parties, without the involvement of Mr. Bayles in any way. When all terms had been accepted by Mrs.
Bayles, she then presented them to Mr. Bayles who had the opportunity to either accept them, reject
them, modify them, or exercise his right of first refusal to purchase Mrs. Bayles's interest by paying
her what she would receive if they were sold to the third parties. (Paragraph #15 of the Decree of
Divorce is ambiguous as to whether "what she would" receive means gross or net. Paragraph #17
appears to imply it means net.)
5. Kier is also applicable as to specific performance. There is no dispute in this case that Mr.
Bayles properly and timely exercised his right of first refusal on each property and there is no dispute
that Mr. Bayles timely tendered full payment of the gross purchase price within thirty (30) days as
-8-

required by paragraph #15 of the Decree of Divorce. Nor is there any dispute that Mrs. Bayles
accepted and negotiated the payments and then refused to perform any of the agreed upon terms of
the contracts. Again, the Utah Supreme Court found that if the parties
... should be obliged to act in good faith in keeping their
promises. It would seem inequitable and unjust to permit a
seller to simply refuse unreasoningly to perform and seek
specious excuses in an attempt to justify his refusal. ... But
neither party should be permited to use the reservation of
"terms" to get more than they had promised: the plaintiff to
get more land, or the defendants to get more money, nor
either to renege on the bargain...
(emphasis added)
6. Mrs. Bayles's acceptance was "positive and unambiguous" as required by the Utah
Supreme Court in RJ. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194 (Utah 1952). Mrs. Bayles's actions in
negotiating the payment and refusal to return payment did not change, add to, or qualify the terms of
the contracts between the parties for the "sale" of Mrs. Bayles's interest in the California properties
and "it's binding force cannot be affected by subsequent communications unless they amount to a
mutual agreement to rescind." Id.
7. In the instant case Mrs. Bayles's terms were all set forth in the Real Estate Contracts she
sent to Mr. Bayles. Mr. Bayles accepted those terms and tendered his "full payment" and demanded
she perform her agreed upon terms. She has the use and benefit of the monies paid to the detriment
of Mr. Bayles. Mrs. Bayles cannot hold hostage the agreed upon deeds and other products and
services she agreed to provide. Mr. Bayles is entitled to specific performance as to the terms of the
contracts or the return of his tender.
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DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
8. It is well established that a person's interest in a retirement plan accrued during a marriage
is considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. See, e.g., Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431,432 (Utah 1982).
9. The best method for distributing or allocating retirement benefits or their value depends on
the particular circumstances. But where possible, the purpose to advance, is that of ending marriage
and allowing the parties to make as much of a clean break from each other as is reasonably possible.
Thus, as between decreeing a more immediate adjustment or simply deferring the other spouse's
participation until payments are eventually received, our Supreme Court has stated that the latter
alternative should be employed only in rare instances. See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076,1079.
10. The Utah Appeals Court in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992)
discussed the manner of distributing retirement benefits:
Pursuant to "Woodward", the preferred method for doing so is
to fix the other spouse's share of the pension plan, as
adjusted for all the appropriate considerations, and satisfy the
other spouse's share out of other assets, thereby leaving all
pension benefits to the employee. See Woodward, 656
p.2d 431 at 433. This is especially true when there are
sufficient other assets for equitable distribution and a present
value of the retirement benefits can be established, idHowever, in the case at bar, it would appear that the trial
court did not even consider such possibility here.
Accordingly, the trial court's order with regard to Mr.
Chambers's retirement benefit is reversed and remanded
with directions to reconsider it's division of Mr.
Chambers's retirement benefits under the analysis set forth
in "Woodward", including particularly the preference for
valuation of the non-employee spouse's share and it's
immediate cash-out from other assets, (emphasis added)
Chambers v. Chambers. 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992).
-10-

11. Obviously, postponing a distribution until monthly payments are received and incurring
possible ongoing entanglement between the parties until one of them dies, is inimical to the goal of
ending the marriage, making as much of a clean break as possible.
12. In a similar case the Utah Court of Appeals in Motes v. Motes, 786 P,2d 232 at 234 - 235
(Utah App. 1989) said:
"The instant case does not involve the difficult questions
presented by retirement programs held by those still working,
which will—or may-only eventually result in income. In the
instant case, like in Greene, one spouse had already retired
and his retirement benefits had ripened into monthly
payments, see 751 P.2d 827 at 828, the present value of
plaintiffs share of the now-fixed stream of income, which the
benefits have become, can be readily calculated and
compensated for with distribution of other assets having an
equivalent value, or cashed out over a comparatively short
time.M
"Accordingly, we reverse the court's treatment
of both parties1 retirement funds and remand for
distribution in accordance with the foregoing." See
Greene v Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (emphasis added)
As with "Greene", this instant case does not have the difficult issues of benefits not yet realized.
In the instant case Mr. Bayles has retired and the present value of his annuity is readily determinable.
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CONCLUSION

CONTRACTS
1. The trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of each of the three (3) California
Purchase Agreements. The trial court committed legal error by incorrectly selecting only one element
or provision of each of the three (3) California Purchase Agreements (ie; the consideration to be paid)
in it's application of established or normal rules of contract construction or interpretation. By selecting
only one element of each of the contracts, the trial court effectively created unenforceable unilateral
contracts. Thus, Plaintiff/Appellant's payment for each of the properties should be returned and the
properties placed back on the market to obtain truely bona-fide enforceable purchase offers.
2. It was judicial error for the trial court to refuse to order specific performance or return the
monies Petitioner/Appellant paid to Respondent/Appellee. The ruling of the trial court should be
reversed and Respondent/Appellee should be ordered to either return all monies she was paid under
the three (3) California Purchase Agreements, or provide all the services and products called for within
the four corners of the contract.
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
3. The trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of a body of Utah Appellate case
law which establish fixed principles for distribution of vested retirement benefits. Especially where the
present value of the retirement annuity can easily be determined and where there are sufficient assets
to provide a lump sum "cash-out" of the Respondent/Appeallee's marital interest in the annuity. Thus
the trial court erred in the distribution of Respondent/Appellee's "Woodward" share of
Petitioner/Appellant's retirement benefits. While the court properly applied the "Woodward" formula
for determining the proper portion of the spousal interest, it clearly failed to apply the proper manner
of distribution of that interest as established in the "Woodward" case as well as other cases.
-12-

4. Accordingly, the trial court's order with regard to Mr. Bayles's retirement benefit should be
reversed and remanded with directions to reconsider it's manner of distributing Mr. Bayles's
retirement benefits under the analysis set forth in "Woodward" and the preference for valuation of the
spouse's share and it's immediate cash-out from other assets.
5. Based on the foregoing, Mr. Bayles respectfully requests that the court reverse and
remand with directions to reconsider it's division of Mr. Bayles's retirement benefits under the
analysis set forth in "Woodward" and the preference for valuation of the spouse's share and it's
immediate cash-out from other assets consistent with this court's decision.

DATED this _Z

Wesley 0 , Bayles,
prose
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day of September, 2007

/

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Wesley 0. Bayles, certify that on the H ' day of September, 2007,1 served
a copy of the attached Brief of the Petitioner/Appellant upon Judy Dawn Barking, the
counsel for Respondent/Appellee in this matter, by mailing to her by first class mall,
postage prepaid to the following address:
Judy Dawn Barking
Attorney at Law
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT 84401

WESLEY 0. BAYLES, Pro Se
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ADDENDUM
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Decree of Divorce
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce
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FILED
NOV 2 5 2002
E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412)
ERIC N. WEEKS (7340)
WEEKS LAW FIRM
Attorneys for Petitioner
1050 Walker Terrace
19 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 322-2800

Layton District Court

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY 0. BAYLES,
I
Petitioner ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 004702059 DA
LINDA CARYL BAYLES,
Judge Thomas L. Kay
Respondent .

The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a
trial on this matter held on October 1 through October 2, 2002.
The Court, having reviewed the documents and pleadings on file
herein, having heard testimony and reviewed documentation and
being fully advised as to both the evidence and law pertaining
thereto, hereby makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The petitioner is a resident of Davis County, State of
Utah, and has been for at least three (3) months immediately prior
to the filing of this action.
INDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VD10820261

2. The parties resided in the marital relationship in the
State of Utah or the acts complained of by the petitioner were
committed by the respondent in the State of Utah and therefore the
above-captioned Court has jurisdiction over the respondent
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) (1953 as amended).
3 . The petitioner and respondent were married in the City
of Bountiful, State of Utah, on the 10th day of August, 1988, and
separated on or about November 28, 2000.
Grounds for Divorce
4. During the course of this marriage, differences have
arisen between the parties, which differences have now become
irreconcilable, thereby making continuation of the marriage
relationship impossible.
5. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
effective October 2, 2002.
Children of the Parties
6. No Children have been born as issue of this marriage
and none are expected.
7 . The respondent currently has physical custody of two
minor children, the petitioner's grand nephew Andrew Vincent
Salazar and Andrew's sister BreAnna Rosa Flores Salazar, who are
not the issue of this marriage.

Custody is held pursuant to

Salazar v. Salazat, case number 954904926 DA, filed in the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
8. The Court finds that the issue of child support was
not certified for trial and, even if it had been, there is no Utah

statute or case law that extends an obligation for petitioner to
pay child support in this circumstance.
Health Insurance
9. Each party should maintain their own health, accident,
hospitalization and dental insurance.

The petitioner should

provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at
the sole cost of the respondent.
10.

On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the

petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March
1, 2002.

The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from

said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by
petitioner.

He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party

to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation.
11.

On August 30, 2002, the Commissioner ruled that his

Order was to be applied prospectively and not retroactively.

He

found the petitioner wrongfully withheld $1,312.50 representing
one-half of the cost of health insurance premiums previously paid
by petitioner for 15 months from the date of separation to the
date of his Order (December 1, 2000, to February 14, 2002) and
ordered the petitioner to reimburse the amount of $1,312.50 to the
respondent.
12.

The petitioner has failed to reimburse to the

respondent $1,312.50, representing petitioner's withholding of 1/2

3

of the cost of health insurance premiums paid from December 1,
2000, through February 14, 2002 ($87.50 x 15 months = $1,312.50).
Debts and Obligations
13.
obligations.

The parties have incurred certain debts and
The parties are unable to afford the lifestyle they

have been maintaining and have incurred extensive credit card
debt.
14.

The respondent should be required to pay and hold

petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card.
15.

The petitioner should be required to pay and hold

the respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First
Credit Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit
Union, and the Firestone account.
16.

Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner

has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations
that existed at the time of separation.

The petitioner shall not

receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such
payments.

This Court finds that the majority of the debt was

incurred by the petitioner and that petitioner had the financial
ability to pay the debt and the respondent did not.
Real Property
17.

The petitioner and the respondent have acquired a

residence located1at 1422 Vineyard Drive, Bountiful, Utah (the
"Bountiful Residence").

The Bountiful Residence should be awarded

to the petitioner subject to the debt thereon.

The respondent

should cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the

petitioner or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest
in the Bountiful Residence.
18.

The petitioner should be permitted to sell the

Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim
or interest therein.

The petitioner should be permitted to retain

any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale
thereof.

Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents

and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed
with the sale and transfer of the Residence.
19.

The respondent should not be responsible for

payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in
August 2001.
20.

The parties have acquired additional interests in

certain other real property, including but not limited to
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County,
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; and
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California,
also known as the Beehive Mine.
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21.

Parcels 1, 13, 15, and 16 are found to be jointly

held by the parties and should be considered joint marital
property.
22.

The Court finds that there is not clear and

convincing evidence of duress associated with plaintiff's transfer
of parcels 8 and 10 to the respondent as a joint tenant.

Parcels

8 and 10 should be considered joint marital property.
23.

The real property and improvements known as Parcel

2 (also known as parcels 22 and 23) located at approximately 10681
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California shall be considered joint
marital property.

There is not sufficient evidence to

conclusively track the funds used to purchase the property and to
establish the lack of commingling that would be required to
establish Parcel 2 (also referred to as Parcels 22 and 23) as the
separate property of the petitioner.
24.

In light of the parties' past payment and debt

history, the above-mentioned California properties should be sold
as soon as possible.
25.

The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to

retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties.
26.

The petitioner should be awarded a right of first

refusal for the purchase of any and all of the California
properties.

Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a

California property, the petitioner shall receive written notice
of the acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) days

from the receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his
election to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona
fid|| offer.

If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal,

he shall pay the respondent the amount she would receive from the
sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the
time he exercises his right of first refusal.
27.
first refusal.

The respondent is awarded a secondary right of
In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise

his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the
same terms as the bona fide offer.

If respondent exercises her

right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be
made within 30 days of the time she exercises her right of first
refusal.
28.

At the time of closing on the sale of each

California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees,
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. .After
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to
receive one-half 6f the total amount of payments he has made
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of
7

October 2002 through the date of sale.

Any and all remaining

proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally
between the parties.
29.

The Court finds that the real property and

improvements located at (a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and (b) Blanding, Utah, are the separate, inherited property
of the petitioner.
30.

The petitioner has made no claim in these

proceedings as to any ownership interest in the home in which
respondent is residing in the State of Oklahoma nor to the
respondent's mother's home in Oklahoma.
Personal Property
31.

The parties have acquired certain joint marital

personal property, including household furniture, motor vehicles,
and certain personal property and possessions.
32.

The respondent should be awarded those, personal

heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates,
platters, clocks, and lamps.

The court finds that the ski pole in

the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole.
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at
the expense of th6 petitioner.
33.

The remainder of the personal property should be

awarded to the parties as currently divided.

34.

The petitioner has received approximately $15,000

more in value of personal property than has the respondent.
35.

The Court finds that the petitioner has paid

$15,000 to the respondent, which shall be considered an offset for
the additional value of personal property received by the
petitioner.
Alimony
36.

The petitioner has made monthly payments to the

respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14,
2002, through the month of October 2002.

These payments shall be

considered temporary alimony.
37.

The respondent has the ability to earn $8 per hour

and to work 40 hours per week.

The petitioner is not working like

he used to work, but historically has had a greater ability to pay
expenses than the respondent has ability to earn money.
38.

Commencing with the month of November 2002, the

petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's
retirement.

Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or

upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of
either party, or lipon the occurrence of any event, which, under
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease.
39.

The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of

petitioner's retirement.

Based upon the current circumstances of
9

the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a
sufficient basis to perfnit a review of alimony.

At the time of

review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued.

Such

review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues
related to payment of retirement and survivor benefits set forth
in the following section.
Pensions and Retirement Benefits
40.

The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement

funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties.
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in
association therewith.
41.

The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option

to elect either full or partial survivor benefits.

The Court

finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at
this time.

The Court reserves for future determination the issue

of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost.

Such

determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph.
42.

In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to

elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a

reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 41 above.
Life Insurance
43 .

The respondent should be listed as a one-half-

interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance
policy on petitioner's life.

The court finds that such

designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of
the parties.
Attorney's Fees
44.

The Court finds three reasons for awarding attorney

fees in this case.

First, the respondent did not ask for the

divorce and did not want the divorce so she had to hire an
attorney.

Secondly, the Court finds the respondent does not have

the ability to pay.

Thirdly, in light of the rulings previously,

the respondent prevailed in more issues than the petitioner.
45.

The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's

attorney's fees by December 2, 2002, based upon petitioner's
ability to pay a portion of the fees.

The respondent should be

ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and
attorney's fees incurred herein.

The petitioner should be ordered

to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred
herein.
Miscellaneous Provisions
46.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver

to the other party any documents required to implement or support
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact.
2 . The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
effective October 2, 2002.
Children of the Parties
3 . The petitioner shall not be obligated to pay child
support to the respondent in regards to Andrew and BreAnna.
Health Insurance
4. Each party should maintain their own health, accident,
hospitalization and dental insurance.

The petitioner should

provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at
the sole cost of the respondent.
5. On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the
petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March
1, 2002.

The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from

said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by
petitioner.

He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party

to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation.
6. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to paragraph 6 above.

1 O

The Court finds

that the check has already been delivered to the respondent as
satisfaction of said obligation.
Debts and Obligations
7. The respondent should be required to pay and hold
petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card.
8. The petitioner should be required to pay and hold the
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union,
and the Firestone account.
9. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations
that existed at the time of separation.

The petitioner shall not

receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such
payments.
Real Property
10.

The Bountiful Residence should be awarded to the

petitioner subject to the debt thereon.

The respondent should

cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner
or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest in the
Bountiful Residence.
11.

The petitioner should be permitted to sell the

Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim
or interest therein.

The petitioner should be permitted to retain

any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale
thereof.

Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents
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and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed
with the sale and transfer of the Residence.
12.

The respondent should not be responsible for

payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in
August 2001.
13.

The parties have acquired additional interests in

certain other real property, including but not limited to
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County,
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California;
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California,
also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of land located
in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 & 23.
14.

The above-mentioned California properties should be

sold as soon as possible.
15.

The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to

retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties.
16.

The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal

for the purchase of any and all of the California properties.

Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer.
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he
exercises his right of first refusal.
17.
first refusal.

The respondent is awarded a secondary right of
In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise

his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the
same terms as the bona fide offer.

If respondent exercises her

right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her right of first
refusal.
18.

At the time of closing on the sale of each

California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees,
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property.

After

such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made

toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of
October 2002 through the date of sale.

Any and all remaining

proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally
between the parties.
19.

The real property and improvements located at

(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding,
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner.
Personal Property
20.

The respondent should be awarded those personal

heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates,
platters, clocks, and lamps.

The court finds that the ski pole in

the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole.
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at
the expense of the petitioner.
21.

The remainder of the personal property should be

awarded to the parties as currently divided.
22.

The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall

be considered an offset for the additional value of personal
property received by the petitioner.
Alimony
23 .

The petitioner has made monthly payments to the

respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount

of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14,
2002 through the month of October 2002.

These payments shall be

considered temporary alimony.
24.

Commencing with the month of November 2002, the

petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's
retirement.

Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or

upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease.
25.

The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of

petitioner's retirement.

Based upon the current circumstances of

the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony.

At the time of

review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued.

Such

review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set
forth in the following section.
Pensions and Retirement Benefits
26.

The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement

funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties.
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula
1n

and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in
association therewith.
27.

The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option

to elect either full or partial survivor benefits.

The Court

finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at
this time.

The Court reserves for future determination the issue

of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost.

Such

determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph.
28.

In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to

elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 27, above.
Life Insurance
29.

The respondent should be listed as a one-half-

interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance
policy on petitioner's life.

The court finds that such

designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of
the parties.
Attorney's Fees
30.

The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's

attorney's fees by December 2, 2002.

The respondent should be

ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and
attorney's fees incurred herein.
1Q

The petitioner should be ordered

to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred
herein.
Miscellaneous Provisions
31.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver

to the other party any documents required to implement or support
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY O. BAYLES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 004702059 DA

LINDA CARYL BAYLES,
Judge Thomas L. Kay
Respondent.

The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a
trial held on October 1 and October 2, 2002.

The Court, having

reviewed the documents and pleadings on file herein, having heard
argument and testimony, and being fully advised as to both the
evidence and law pertaining thereto, and having previously entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact.
2 . The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
effective October 2, 2002.

IMJUWAVK-
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Children of the Parties
3. The petitioner is not obligated to pay child support
to the respondent in regards to Andrew Vincent Salazar and BreAnna
Rosa Flores Salazar.
Health Insurance
4. Each party shall maintain their own health, accident,
hospitalization and dental insurance.

The petitioner shall

provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at
the sole cost of the respondent.
5. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to the Commissioner's earlier
recommendation.

The check has already been delivered to the

respondent as satisfaction of said obligation.
Debts and Obligations
6. The respondent is required to pay and hold petitioner
harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the Citibank
card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card.
7 . The petitioner is required to pay and hold the
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union,
and the Firestone account.
8. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations
that existed at the time of separation.
2

The petitioner shall not

receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such
payments.
Real Property
9. The Bountiful Residence is awarded to the petitioner
subject to the debt thereon.

The respondent shall execute a

quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner or other documents
necessary to relinquish her interest in the Bountiful Residence.
10.

The petitioner is permitted to sell the Bountiful

Residence, with the respondent having no further claim or interest
therein.

The petitioner shall be permitted to retain any profit

or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale thereof.
Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents and taking
any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed with the
sale and transfer of the Residence.
11.

The respondent is not responsible for payment of

the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful Residence for the
period she resided in the Residence from the date of separation
through the time she moved to Oklahoma in August 2001.
12.

The parties jointly hold certain other real

property, namely (a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements
located at 10692 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b)
Parcel 13 of land and associated improvements located at 10747
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land
and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba
County, California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated
improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County,
California; (e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County,
3

California, also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of
land located in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22
& 23.
13.

The above-mentioned California properties shall be

sold as soon as possible.
14.

The petitioner is hereinafter entitled to retain

the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and is obligated to
maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for said parcels
through the date of sale of said properties.
15.

The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal

for the purchase of any and all of the California properties.
Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer.
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he
exercises his right of first refusal.
16.
first refusal.

The respondent is awarded a secondary right of
In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise

his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the
same terms as the bona fide offer.
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If respondent exercises her

right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her, right of first
refusal.
17.

At the time of closing on the sale of each

California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees,
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property.

After

such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of
October 2002 through the date of sale.

Any and all remaining

proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally
between the parties.
18.

The real property and improvements located at

(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding,
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner.
Personal Property
19.

The respondent is awarded those personal heirlooms

located at the California properties, namely plates, platters,
clocks, and lamps.

The ski pole in the possession of the

petitioner is a family heirloom of the respondent and respondent
is awarded the ski pole.

Petitioner is permitted to make a model

of the ski pole and shall deliver possession of the ski pole to
5

the respondent within 90 days of entry of this Decree at her place
of residence and at the expense of the petitioner.
20.

The remainder of the personal property is awarded

to the parties as currently divided.
21.

The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall

be considered an offset for the additional value of personal
property received by the petitioner.
Alimony
22.

The petitioner has made monthly payments to the

respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14,
2002 through the month of October 2002.

These payments shall be

considered temporary alimony.
23.

Commencing with the month of November 2002, the

petitioner is hereinafter obligated to pay alimony to the
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's
retirement.

Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or

upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease.
24.

The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of

petitioner's retirement.

Based upon the current circumstances of

the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony.

At the time of

review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the
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monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued.

Such

review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues
related to payment of the retirement and survivor' benefits set
forth in the following section.
Pensions and Retirement Benefits
25.

The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement

funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties.
The respondent is entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in
association therewith.
26.

The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option

to elect either full or partial survivor benefits.

The Court

finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at
this time.

The Court reserves for future determination the issue

of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost.

Such

determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph.
27.

In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to

elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 26, above.
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Life Insurance
28.

The respondent shall be listed as a one-half-

interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance
policy on petitioner's life.
Attorney's Fees
29.

The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's

attorney's fees by December 2, 2002.

The respondent is ordered to

assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and attorney's fees
incurred herein.

The petitioner is ordered to assume and pay his

own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein.
Miscellaneous Provisions
30.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the

other party any documents required to implement or support the
provisions of this Decree.
MADE AND ENTERED this ^ ^ d a v of November, 2002.
BY THE COURT:
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District Court Judge Y:-V " "
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Michael D. Murphy (#5115)
Attorney for Petitioner
13 North Main
P.O. Box 15
Kaysville, Utah 84037
(801) 547-9274

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY O. BAYLES,

)
)
)

Petitioner

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)

LINDA CARYL BAYLES,

)

Civil No. 004702059

)

Judge Thomas L. Kay

Respondent.

This matter came on regularly scheduled before this Court
for trial on July 3, 2 006, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District
Court Judge, presiding.
by

his

attorney,

Petitioner was present and represented

Michael

D.

Murphy,

and

the

Respondent

was

present and represented by her attorney, Judy Dawn Barking.

The

Court, after hearing argument and testimony and having reviewed
the parties' exhibits,and being fully advised in the premises,
now makes and enters on July 5, 2006 the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
or

not

The court finds that the issues in this case is whether
Petitioner

Respondent

and

what,

should
if

continue

any,

money

to
that

pay

alimony

Petitioner

Respondent since June of 2 004 should be paid back.

to
has

the
paid

2.

The

Court

finds

that

the

second

issue

the

Court

is

considering is who should pay for the survivor benefits and if
Respondent

should

reimburse

the

Petitioner

for

the

survivor

benefits that he paid since the filing of the Petition to Modify
on June, 2 0 04.
3.

The third issue is the parcels of property and whether

or not the Respondent should strictly comply with the terms and
conditions which accompanied the various post divorce sales of
the various parcels of property.
4.

The

fourth

issue

is what

should

be

done

with

the

remaining unsold five-acre parcel.
5. The fifth issue is who should be ordered to pay attorney
fees in this matter.
6.

The

sixth

issue

is

who

should

be

responsible

for

transportation costs and costs of trial.
7.

The remaining issue of whether or not Petitioner should

continue to maintain the Respondent as a beneficiary on his life
insurance policy has been stipulated and the parties

stipulate

that Petitioner should no longer be obligated to carry Respondent
as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy.
8.
was,

In regards to alimony, the Court finds that Petitioner

at the time

of October

Internal Revenue Service.

2002,

employed

full

time at the

Petitioner had not had his disability

rating from IRS prior to the trial and was earning almost twice*
per month at the time of the entry of the Decree of
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Divorce than he is earning now.

The Court further finds that

Petitioner filed the Petition to Modify in June of 2004 and that
he was current in his monthly alimony through May of 2005.

The

Court further finds that from May of 2005, Respondent has been
able to hold her own.
9.

The

ability

Court

to pay

finds

alimony.

should terminate.

that

Petitioner

Petitioner

is

no

longer

disabled

and

has

the

alimony

The Court finds that the parties' incomes are

substantially similar and there is no way that alimony can be
justified.

Even

if

the

Respondent

needs

alimony,

Petitioner

cannot pay alimony.
10. The Court finds that $12,000 of alimony has been paid
from the time of the motion to modify in June of 2004 through May
of 2005. The Court finds that what alimony has been paid has been
paid.

The Court further finds that it is not appropriate under

the circumstances of this case to order that the alimony that was
paid has to be repaid.
on-going

alimony,

Both parties shall go forward with no

or with

no

alimony

to be

refunded

or

no

alimony due.
11.

In regard to the survivor benefits, the Court finds

that the cost of the survivor benefits is approximately $272.00
per month and the issue is who should pay for those survivor
benefits.

Respondent already pays a proportion of the cost of

the Survivor Benefit by virtue of a proportional reduction of her
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Woodward share of the retirement benefit. Respondent will benefit
by those survivor benefits.

She currently receives $599.00 per

month and that amount will be increased annually pursuant to cost
of living increases.
Respondent's

If Petitioner dies prior to the Respondent,

survivor

benefits

would

triple.

The

Court

sees

arguments of the parties both ways in determining who should be
obligated to pay for the survivor benefits and finds an argument
can be made for splitting it down the middle.

The Court finds

that the survivor benefit has been chosen and has to continue and
that Petitioner should be ordered to pay for it just as it has
been in the past.
back

survivor

Respondent will have no obligation to pay any

benefit

payments. Respondent

currently

receives

$599.00 per month as her Woodward share of the retirement and
that amount will be increased annually pursuant to annual cost of
living increases.
12. As an off-set of the survivor benefits being paid as
they currently are, Petitioner shall receive the five acre parcel
of property,

free

and

clear

subject to any debt thereon.

of

any

claim

by

the Respondent,

Petitioner will have full authority

to sell the five acre parcel and receive all monies from that
sale. The Court finds that if Petitioner lives 20 more years, the
cost of the five acre parcel gets roughly close to what it would
cost him to pay for the survivor benefit.
is fair.

The Court finds that

The Court further finds that everybody agrees that
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there

may

be

a

title

problem

on

this

five

acres

and

that

Petitioner may get less than what he's going to have to pay over
the time, but

finds that's the best

the Court

can do. It is

equitable to give Respondent survivor benefit, but appropriate to
give Petitioner a source of funds with which to pay the survivor
benefit.
13.

In regards as to whether Respondent should comply with

all terms of the sales

for the various parcels of properties

since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the court finds that
the position of Petitioner

is that Respondent

accepted

offers

that included terms of a grant deed, title insurance, and other
items, and that these were bona fide offers.
The Court finds that things like title insurance and things
like these other issues, normally in a closing on a sale, all
these things are deducted, including real estate commissions or
whatever they are, as closing costs.

The Court further finds

that's what would have happened if the closing of these sales
contracts would have been sent to a third party.
The Court finds that if Petitioner wished to have Respondent
comply with the terms of the sales contracts, then Petitioner
should have done them prior to the time he sent payment.
The Court finds Petitioner can argue that Respondent should
have been put on notice of the terms of the contracts because
they were in the contracts.
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The Court finds that Respondent had not complied with the
terms of the sales contracts, but that Petitioner did not demand
compliance

with

the

terms

of

the

sales

contracts

until

after

payment had been made.
The Court

further finds the terms of the sales

contracts

were more of a technicality than what the bargain was.
Thus
going

the Court

to have

contracts.
contempt

is not going to order that Respondent

to comply

with

any of

the

terms

of

the

is

sales

Consequently, Respondent shall not be held in

for not

complying

any of the terms contained

in the

sales contracts of the various parcels of real property.
Respondent was not put on notice to perform all the terms of
the contracts before the checks for payment were sent; therefore,
the

Court

will

not

order

additional

performance

other

than

requiring Respondent to provide Petitioner with a grant deed on
property held by the parties by a grant deed and with a quit
claim deed on properties held by the parties on a quit claim
deed.
As co-owner of the property by quit claim deed, Petitioner
cannot complain of not getting a warranty deed from Respondent.
Petitioner should not get better title than he had before;

he

takes the property like it was when he had it prior to adding
Respondent

to

the

title.

Respondent's

only

obligation

is

to

provide Petitioner with the deed.
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14. Each party shall pay for their own attorney fees.
15.

The court further finds that each party shall pay for

their own costs and expenses.

Petitioner's attorney shall

reimburse the Respondent, as agreed, $120.00.
the

cost

that

Respondent

incurred

for

This $120.00 is

Petitioner's

attorney

making a motion for continuing the June 2 006 trial based upon the
death of Petitioner's attorney's aunt.
16.
title

to

The Court finds that in regards to Petitioner obtaining
the

various

properties,

Respondent

shall

convey

to

Petitioner titles to the various properties as follows: If the
parties acquired title to a parcel of property by a grant deed,
then Petitioner shall receive a grant deed from Respondent.

If

the parties acquired title to a parcel of property by a quit
claim deed, then Petitioner shall receive a quit claim deed from
Respondent.

Respondent shall have three months from the date of

this ruling, July 5, 2006, to convey title to Petitioner for the
unconveyed titles of property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the parties are subject to the

jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's
Findings of Fact, that the Petitioner is entitled to an Order
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Modifying Decree of Divorce, the same to become final upon entry
herein.
2.

The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute

have been resolved with the Court pursuant to the above Findings
of Fact.
SIGNED and DATED this

day of

, 2007.

BY THE COURT

JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage
prepaid, this
day of
, 2007, to:
Judy Dawn Barking
Attorney for Respondent
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT 844 01

Secretary

Michael D. Murphy (#5115)
Attorney for Petitioner
13 North Main
P.O. Box 15
Kaysville, Utah 84037
(801) 547-9274

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY O. BAYLES,

)
)
)

Petitioner

ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.

)

LINDA CARYL BAYLES,

)

Civil No. 004702059

)

Judge Thomas L. Kay

Respondent.

This matter came on regularly scheduled before this Court
for trial on July 3, 2006, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District
Court Judge, presiding.
by

his

attorney,

Michael

Petitioner was present and represented
D.

Murphy,

and

the

Respondent

was

present and represented by her attorney, Judy Dawn Barking.

The

Court, after hearing argument and testimony and having reviewed
the parties' exhibits,and being fully advised in the premises,
and having previously entered on July 5, 2006 its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following
Order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,. AND DECREED:
1.

Pursuant

to the parties' stipulation,

the

Petitioner

shall no longer be obligated to carry Respondent as a beneficiary
on his life insurance policy.

2.

Pursuant to the Court's findings that Petitioner no

longer has the ability to pay alimony,

petitioner is disabled,

and the parties' incomes are substantially similar and there is
no way alimony can be justified.

Even if the Respondent needs

alimony, Petitioner cannot pay alimony, and the Court orders that
alimony shall terminate.
3.

The $12,000 in alimony payments made since 2004 shall

not be refunded.

What alimony has been paid has been paid and

the alimony that was paid shall not be repaid.

Both parties

shall go forward with no on-going alimony, or with no alimony to
be refunded or with no alimony due.
4.

The survivor retirement benefits shall continue to be

paid as they have been and Petitioner shall continue to pay for
it just as it has been in the past.

Respondent shall have no

obligation to pay any back survivor benefit payments.
5. As an off-set of the survivor benefits being paid as they
currently are, Petitioner shall receive the five acre parcel of
property, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent, subject
to any debt thereon.

Petitioner shall have full authority to

sell the five acre parcel and receive all monies from that sale.
6.

Respondent

shall not have to comply with any of the

terms of the sales contracts other than Respondent shall provide
Petitioner with a grant deed on property held by the parties by a
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grant deed and with a quit claim deed on properties held by the
parties on a quit claim deed.

Respondent shall not be held in

contempt for not complying with all the terms contained in the
sale of the various parcels of real property.
7. Each party shall pay for their own attorney fees.
8.

Each party shall pay for their own costs and expenses.

Petitioner's attorney shall reimburse the Respondent, as agreed,
$120.00.

This $120.00 is the cost that Respondent incurred for

Petitioner's

attorney making

a motion

for continuing

the June

2006 trial based upon the death of Petitioner's attorney's aunt.
9.

Respondent shall convey to the Petitioner titles to the

various properties as follows:
a parcel

of

property

by

If the parties acquired title to

a grant

deed,

receive a grant deed from Respondent.
title

to

Petitioner

a

parcel
shall

of

property

receive

a

quit

by

then

Petitioner

shall

If the parties acquired
a

claim

quit
deed

claim
from

deed,

then

Respondent.

Respondent shall have three months from the date of this ruling,
July 5, 2006, to convey title to Petitioner for the unconveyed
titled of property.
SIGNED and DATED this

day of

, 2007.

BY THE COURT

JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order Modifying Decree, postage prepaid, this
day of
, 2007, to:
Judy Dawn Barking
Attorney for Respondent
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT 84401

Secretary

